Vice-President Kashim Shettima

Sometime in January this year, a senior Lagos-Ibadan journalist called my attention to a news story in which Hannatu Musawa, President Tinubu’s Minister of Art, Culture, Tourism and Creative Economy, said with earnest certainty that dropping Vice President Kashim Shettima as Tinubu’s running mate would gravely imperil Tinubu’s reelection chances. He wanted to know what I thought about it.

I promised I would share my thoughts in a column the following week, but more urgent matters that needed my discursive interventions came up, and I didn’t get round to doing it. In the intervening months, several other people have echoed Musawa’s sentiments. As maneuvers for the 2027 election intensify, the question of Shettima’s place in Tinubu’s 2027 calculus keeps taking center stage.

To my knowledge, no one has sufficiently articulated the socio-historical, political, strategic, ethnographic and even emotive reasons for the choice of Shettima as Tinubu’s running mate, or why his replacement, especially with a northern Christian as is being rumored, would convulse the foundations of the Tinubu presidency.

I have pointed out in many past columns that in Nigeria’s emotional cartography, there are five broad ethnographic cocoons, which I like to sometimes call emotional maps, that have evolved independently and have broadly shaped voting and other kinds of national behavior.

There is the Northern Muslim Bloc that largely transcends northern ethnic boundaries, the Yoruba Bloc that mostly papers over religious differences, the Northern Christian Bloc that collapses ethnic and subregional borders, the Igbo Bloc that is self-explanatorily ethnically and religiously homogenous and the Southern Minority Bloc that encompasses a multiplicity of ethnicities that are neither Yoruba nor Igbo.

This emotional cartography isn’t intended to be a simplistic, self-sufficient and unnuanced mapping of diverse people into unproblematized boxes where there are no internal differences. It is intended only to show that, generically speaking, these broad collectivities tend to coalesce around the same affectional bonds in relation to national issues.

In the politics of emotional affiliation to, or connection with, the center of power, feelings of group representation draw on these maps. For example, the appointment of General Christopher Gwabin Musa first as Chief of Defense Staff and later as Minister of Defense has been a source of recognizable representational nourishment for most northern Christians across ethnic and subregional divides, even though Musa is from Kaduna, which is supposed to be in the Northwest.

So, based on my mapping of the emotional contours of Nigeria’s ethnographic landscape, the Tinubu-Shettima ticket actually is not, strictly speaking, the Muslim-Muslim ticket people say or think it is. It is, in reality, a Yoruba-Muslim ticket. Here’s why.

Tinubu, like most Yoruba people, defines himself first and foremost as a Yoruba person before he is anything else. That was why, in his 2022 Abeokuta speech, he prefaced “Emi lo kan” with “Yoruba lo kan.” In other words, he derived the social, political and emotional basis for the legitimacy of his presidential aspiration from his Yoruba identity.

Islam is incidental, even expendable, to Tinubu’s identity. This was dramatized this week when the presidency had to debunk a bizarre rumor that Tinubu had converted to Christianity.

Shettima, on the other hand, can’t afford to define himself as Kanuri in the context of national politics. On the national stage, he is the symbolic representation of collective northern Muslims, although this does not erase his Kanuri and cosmopolitical credentials. In other words, Shettima is primarily a northern Muslim who provides the symbolic conduit through which Muslims in the North identify with the administration he is a part of.

Some, maybe even most, northern Muslims may disagree with the administration and even with Shettima himself. But that’s in the region of the head. In their hearts, however, it’s a different matter. It’s like having a mother you disagree with but whose presence you cherish nonetheless because her absence would create a crushing emptiness in you.

In fact, no northerner, whether Christian or Muslim, can stake his or her national political aspiration on an ethnic platform. They would usually choose a pan-northern platform or a religious justification for their aspirations, depending on the context.

It needs to be pointed out that I am not making any moral judgments here. Tinubu’s appeal to Yoruba nationalism is not inferior to northern politicians’ appeals to regional or religious solidarity. The differences merely reflect how differently we have evolved politically and emotionally.

Now, replacing Shettima with a northern Christian running mate is fair in view of what appears to be the systematic exclusion of northern Christians at the top since the return of democracy in 1999. However, even at the risk of being misunderstood, it needs to be pointed out that such a move would signal two things.

First, contrary to what many people are inclined to assume, it won’t be a Muslim-Christian ticket. It would be a Yoruba-Christian ticket. As I pointed out earlier, Tinubu’s self- and collective identity-definition is primarily Yoruba, and it’s the basis for his claim to the presidency. Until fairly recently, he didn’t even publicly identify with Islam and still stumbles when he tries to perform his secondary Muslim identity.

Second, Tinubu has to contend with the altered demographic calculations for the 2027 election that the choice of a northern Christian running mate would present. In the 2023 election, most northern Christians voted for Peter Obi, with Benue State being the notable exception. In Benue, Tinubu rode on the coattails of the then wildly popular APC governorship candidate Rev. Fr. Hyacinth Iormem Alia to victory.

Since 63.6 percent of Tinubu’s 8,805,420 votes in 2023 came from the North, it is safe to assume that most of those votes came from the Northern Muslim Bloc. To get rid of the ethnographic, emotional symbol of such a bloc in your quest for a second term, you have to be able to compensate for the electoral loss such a move would most certainly provoke. That seems like a tall order.

True, northern Christians seem to have warmed up to the Tinubu administration, perhaps because the anxieties that activated their hostility haven’t materialized. In fact, in May 2025, as Tinubu prepared to travel to Rome for the inauguration of Pope Leo XIV, the presidency reportedly supplied THISDAY with data that showed 62 percent of Tinubu’s appointees were Christians.

Bayo Onanuga later echoed the same claim at the Vatican when he said he had read that 62 percent of the president’s cabinet members were Christians.

Tinubu’s handlers can point not only to presidency-supplied claims about Christian appointments but also to a trail of public statements by some northern Christian bodies and clerics who said, in varying degrees of intensity, that his appointments had softened, answered or “allayed” fears over the Muslim-Muslim ticket.

For example, Rev. Kelvin Pwajok of the Northern Christian Forum thanked Tinubu in September 2023 for appointing northern Christians such as George Akume and Christopher Musa to strategic positions. Dominic Alancha of All Christian Youths in Northern Nigeria said the group’s earlier reservations had been eased by Tinubu’s appointments. Rev. Yakubu Pam of Northern CAN said in January 2025 that Tinubu had shown reasonable inclusiveness.

Archbishop John Praise Daniel of the Northern Christian Religious Leaders’ Assembly said in October 2025 that Christians did not feel sidelined and that Tinubu’s appointments had allayed many fears. Rev. Amos Mohzo of COCIN also thanked Tinubu for supporting northern Christians through appointments such as Akume as SGF and Nentawe Yilwatda as APC national chairman. In May 2026, the Christian Northern Nigeria Progressive Forum backed Tinubu’s re-election and framed its support around inclusion, fairness and national stability.

By contrast, Muslim groups and clerics have complained that the Muslim-Muslim ticket has not translated into commensurate representation for Muslims in Tinubu’s appointments.

For example, the Supreme Council for Shari’ah in Nigeria said Muslims remained politically marginalized despite their support for the ticket, while Professor Mansur Ibrahim Sokoto argued that Tinubu won Muslim votes but had since sidelined Muslims and the North.

Yoruba Muslim bodies have made a more specific regional case. MURIC has repeatedly alleged that South-West Muslims have been shortchanged. It even described some appointments as “Christian-Christian” under a Muslim-Muslim presidency. The Concerned Yoruba Muslim Scholars in Nigeria said Yoruba Muslims had expected Tinubu’s presidency to redress their long-standing marginalization but have instead faced deeper exclusion. MUSWEN also said South-West Muslims are underrepresented in federal appointments relative to their demographic strength and intellectual weight.

In other words, dropping Shettima in favor of a Christian running mate would effectively create a perceptual “Christian-Christian” ticket in the North. Northern politicians like Musawa who have an intimate familiarity with the sociology of northern politics know that this would sound the death knell of Tinubu’s second term bid, especially in light of Peter Obi’s dominance in the Southeast, which will deprive Tinubu of bloc votes from the South.

This choice comes with an even more poignant existential implication. Historically, in moments of political trauma, northern elites tend to instrumentalize religion to rouse the masses to popular action. Should Tinubu somehow manage to “win” without a northern Muslim running mate, he could have an unprecedentedly convulsive Nigeria to preside over.